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Summary 
 
Title: Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the 
North Sea 
 
- A risk based model for concept selection of normally 
unmanned installations in the North Sea 
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Problem statement: Should a normally unmanned installation rely on helicopter 
shuttling to allow for the people working there to be 
accommodated at another platform during the resting periods 
with regards to the potential loss of life (PLL)? Would the risk 
the personnel are exposed to increase or decrease if the need 
for helicopter shuttling was eliminated due to a different design 
allowing for periodic manning of the installation? 
 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to develop a coarse framework, a 
model, for risk-based concept selection of normally unmanned 
installations (NUI) in the North Sea by comparison of PLL. 
The results of the model will be used to indicate, with regards 
to PLL, whether a NUI should be designed to allow for 
periodical manning instead of relying on helicopter shuttling to 
an accommodation platform during. 
 
Method: The model is constructed through the use of historical data. The 
risk contribution due to helicopter flights is estimated by failure 
data from offshore helicopter flights in the North Sea. The risk 
contribution due to the crew being present on the platform is 
estimated through data used in QRAs for various North Sea 
installations. The model is based on a generic area distribution 
where each area has a FAR value which in turn is based on 
representative area-FAR values for installations in the North 
Sea. To use the model, inputs such as manning distributions, 
flight times and required work load is required. 
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Conclusions: The model can be used to qualitatively indicate which of the 
two alternatives will subject a generic crew to the lowest level 
of PLL. There needs to be an evaluation coupled with the 
results though, with regards to how the limitations of the model 
might have affected the results. There is room for 
improvements in the model, which if implemented could 
improve the reliability of the model and accuracy of its results. 
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1 Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description 
AP Accommodation Platform 
CCR Central Control Room 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
FAR Fatal Accident Rate 
FEED Front-End Engineering Design 
FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Offloading 
HIPPS High Integrity Pressure Protection System 
HVAC Heating, Venting and Air Conditioning 
I/A Incident/Accident 
IR Individual Risk 
LDP Landing Decision Point 
LER Local Electrical Room 
LQ Living Quarters 
MAC Mid-Air Collision 
NUI Normally Unmanned Installation 
OGP International Association of Oil & Gas Producers 
PLL Potential Loss of Life 
PMI Periodically Manned Installation 
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (Norwegian) 
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis 
TDP Take-off Decision Point 
TLP Tension Leg Platform 
TO/L Take-off/Landing 
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2 Definitions 
Term Description 
Area-FAR The area-FAR is the expected number of fatalities per 100 
million exposed hours in a physically bounded 
area /2/ 
FAR The FAR value expresses the number of fatalities per 100 
million exposed hours for a defined group of personnel. 
The FAR is often used as a risk parameter. Several 
variants are used, mainly reflecting how the averaging of 
the risk level is done /2/ 
FAR for an entire 
installation 
The FAR value for an entire installation is the number of 
expected fatalities per 100 million exposed hours for one 
or several specified installations. The risk level is 
averaged over all positions onboard /2/ 
IR Risk an individual is exposed to during a defined period 
of time /2/ 
PLL The PLL is a statistically expected nr of fatalities within a 
specified population during a specified period of time /2/ 
Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea 
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3 Introduction 
3.1 Introduction 
Today, oil is produced in almost every part of the world, from small offshore wells to 
water depths of 2000 meters. For offshore oil production, depending on the size and 
water depth, a whole range of different structures are used. Some of the common 
offshore structures are described below and can be seen in Figure 3-1: 
 
• Shallow water complex 
A shallow water complex is a network of several fixed platforms connected through 
gangways. The different platforms have different functions such as the Wellhead 
platform, the Accommodations platform and the Power Generation platform and so 
on. A shallow water complex is, as revealed by its name, useful in water depths not 
greater than 100 meters. 
 
• Gravity base 
The gravity base, as opposed to the shallow water complex, is one huge fixed 
platform that contains all functions needed, e.g. production, accommodation. The top-
side structure rests on a fixed foundation of concrete which in turn rests on the sea 
bottom and is held in place by gravity. The concrete foundation is cast onshore and 
towed out to be placed at its assigned location which could be up to a couple of 
hundred meters in water depth. The way this is possible is through air filled storage 
cells in the concrete structure that helps to keep it afloat. Once these cells have been 
emptied, in order to place the structure, they can be used to store the oil instead. 
 
• Compliant tower 
Compliant towers are similar to the previously described fixed platforms but for its 
base which consists of a slender tower fixed on the seabed. The main difference of 
this base is its flexibility which allows for far greater resistance against the pressure 
the wind and waves exert on the structure. This in turn makes this type of oil platform 
a viable option for up to 1000 meters of water depth. 
 
• Floating production, storing and offloading (FPSO) 
The FPSO is a floating vessel designed to collect oil and natural gas from various 
platforms and well installations in the area, process them and store them and they can 
operate in waters 2000 meters deep. A FPSO can be specifically built for this 
purpose, or can be a rebuilt oil tanker or a large barge and they are a great advantage 
in regions that do not have an existing pipeline network set up. 
 
• Tension leg platform (TLP) 
Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea 
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The TLP is another floating structure; however, it is moored to the sea bottom by long 
steel pipes that not only keep the platform in location, but also provide vertical 
stability. They can operate in water depths of up to 2000 meters and are also found in 
a miniature version called a “Sea star platform”. 
 
• Subsea Production System (SPS) 
The subsea production system is unique in this context since the structure is placed on 
the sea bottom instead of at the surface like the previously described units. This 
structure does not perform any of the drillings or well completions but is dependent 
on help from a separate rig to perform these tasks. Once in place though, the subsea 
production system can retrieve hydrocarbons from several wells over a large area 
through pipelines on the seafloor. It transports the hydrocarbons either to another 
platform or in some cases directly to an onshore facility depending on the subsea 
facility’s location and is able to operate in very deep waters. 
 
• SPAR 
The SPAR is a floating platform used in waters as deep as 3000 meters. The floating 
capability is due to the fact that the top side structure sits on top of an enormous 
floating cylinder, which in turn is tethered to the seabed by several cables. In addition 
to the floating effect, the cylinder also provides stabilization to the structure even 
during hurricane conditions. 
 
• Normally unmanned installation (NUI) 
The normally unmanned installations are usually smaller shallow water complexes. 
However, as revealed by their name, they are normally not manned. Instead they are 
regularly visited by work crews who arrive to perform maintenance work. The NUIs 
are usually neither as large nor as complex as their manned counterparts. 
Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea 
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1 
Figure 3-1 different kinds of oil platforms and the water depth range in which they are 
used.  
 
3.1.1 The history 
For thousands of years man has used oil for lighting and heating purposes. However, 
the oil in larger underground reservoirs was still unattainable in those days and 
consequently the only oil used was found and collected from more accessible sources 
e.g. tar ponds and seepages from shallow reservoirs.  This all changed in 1859 when 
Edwin Drake drilled a well in the north-western parts of Pennsylvania, USA, with the 
one purpose of retrieving oil. These early drilled wells were primitive and shallow by 
today’s standards, but they still managed to be quite productive which made 
overproduction a problem to be considered right from the start. 
 
The automobile industry, which was established in the late 19th century, soon adopted 
the oil as its fuel. Furthermore the maritime industry saw great advantages in using oil 
too since oil fueled ships could travel twice as fast as the old coal fired ones, which 
was found to be a great advantage for the military. The aviation industry did not just 
gain an advantage through the use of the new fuel but was completely dependent on it 
since gasoline engines were material in constructing useful aircrafts. With World War 
II came improved welding techniques, pipe rolling and metallurgical developments 
                                                     
1http://www.google.se/imgres?hl=sv&biw=1920&bih=955&tbm=isch&tbnid=hi-
hMiE6Sg1NKM:&imgrefurl=http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/grc04-
863/chapt4.htm&docid=KPpWkDBXI4RsuM&imgurl=http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/grc04-
863/fig8.jpg&w=634&h=425&ei=XMcgUO7pJu3S4QTYxIH4DA&zoom=1&iact=rc&dur=643&sig=102188721247
895686148&page=1&tbnh=126&tbnw=188&start=0&ndsp=46&ved=1t:429,r:5,s:0,i:84&tx=92&ty=60 
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and these in turn brought forth the possibility of long distance pipeline constructions, 
resulting in natural gas becoming a viable resource. Simultaneously the petrochemical 
industry started increasing its production to meet the demand for the new plastic 
materials. Through the steadily increasing demand for oil, alternative sources that 
previously would have supplied oil at too great a cost are now becoming viable 
options. 
 
3.1.2 The reservoir 
Hydrocarbons, e.g. oil and natural gas, are formed when organic material is exposed 
to high temperatures and pressures for long periods of time. The organic material can 
be subjected to these conditions when it gets trapped under layers of rock through a 
sedimentation process. A hydrocarbon reservoir though, can only be formed if the 
hydrocarbons have access to some sort of porous rock, e.g. sandstone or limestone, 
for them to amass in. Also, to stop the hydrocarbons forming in the reservoir from 
escaping the reservoir has to be enclosed by a non-porous rock layer, e.g. salt, shale, 
chalk or mud rock. Several parameters, including time, pressure and temperature, 
dictate what form, e.g. heavy crude, oil or natural gas the bulk of the hydrocarbons 
will be in. The pressure also helps in retrieving the hydrocarbons since they are forced 
out of the rock. To further the production even more analyzes are performed both 
with 3D modeling and seismic data, however typically, more than half of the 
hydrocarbons are forced to be left in the reservoir. 
 
Even though the pressure helps in retrieving the hydrocarbons by forcing them out of 
the rock, in addition to advanced 3D modeling and access to various seismic data, 
more than half of the hydrocarbons are typically forced to be left in the reservoir. 
 
3.1.3 The well 
When a suitable reservoir is found, the process of retrieving the hydrocarbons begin. 
A hollowed out drill string, consisting of pipe segments which are continuously added 
to the drill string to lengthen it as the drilling proceeds, with a drill bit at the end of it 
is used for this purpose. The drill, which is powered by hydraulic or electric force, 
utilizes its empty core to pump “drilling mud” down into the well which then returns 
to the surface outside of the drill string. The purpose of this is to bring rock fragments 
to the surface as well as to clean, cool and lubricate parts. Another very important 
function of the mud is to balance the pressure in the hydrocarbon reservoir to prevent 
a possible blow out. The drill will frequently come across cavities with hidden 
hydrocarbons that because of the pressure will try to force themselves to the surface. 
This scenario can create a dangerous situation known as a “blow out”. 
 
After the drilling part is done, the well needs to be stabilized in order to be used. This 
step includes the installation of well casing, tubing and a wellhead. The casing usually 
consists of metal tubes cemented in place in order to stop unwanted materials to seep 
into the well. Tubing is then placed inside the well casing and it’s through the tubing 
that the hydrocarbons are brought to the surface. The wellhead is an installation 
placed at the top side opening of the well and its main function is to control the flow 
Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea 
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of hydrocarbons through the well. The wellhead is also a safety measure, since it is 
designed to prevent blow outs. 
/1/ 
 
 
2 
Figure 3-2 Schematic picture of drilling in an oil reservoir. 
 
3.1.4 The hydrocarbons 
The hydrocarbons in the reservoir are often a mix of crude oil, natural gas and various 
condensates.  
 
Crude oil can vary considerably both in appearance and composition from clear to 
black and from watery to almost solid. Its uses vary in the same way and crude oil is 
found as a main component in fuel for all kinds of vehicles, in asphalt and in 
lubricants. What types of hydrocarbons make up the crude oil directly affects its 
usefulness as hydrocarbons with very low or a very high number of carbon atoms will 
render the oil unsuitable to be used as fuel. However, through processing heavier 
crude oil in a refinery it is possible to crack and reform the heavier crude oil 
molecules to reduce the number of carbon atoms, making more of the oil suitable to 
be used as fuel. /16/ 
 
The natural gas found in the reservoirs does not completely consist of methane, as the 
consumer product, but also consists of other hydrocarbons.  It is also fouled by other 
non-hydrocarbon compounds. Not much processing is done to the natural gas aside 
from separating the methane from other components. /15/ 
 
                                                     
2 http://www.encapgroup.com/drilling/images/oil-drilling-derrick.gif 
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The condensates are separated from the natural gas in order to purify it. However, 
these hydrocarbons are useful in their own right. They can be sold separately and the 
applications range from energy sources to enhancing oil recovery in production wells. 
/14/ 
 
3.2 Background 
All offshore production platforms except for subsea installations require manning 
either periodically or permanently in order to carry out various activities on the 
installations. The level of manning varies significantly depending on the size and 
complexity of the platform as well as the reservoir conditions. The manning varies 
from normally unmanned platforms (NUI) to permanently manned platforms with 
hundreds of people onboard. Since the helicopter risk is one of the main contributors 
to the total risk level, the concept selection of the platform plays a vital role in order 
to achieve as low a risk as practically possible through optimization of the frequency 
of manning, see section 3.2.1 below for an example. 
 
There is no common practice as of today on concept selection of normally unmanned 
installations with regards to designing them for overnight stays. The practice varies 
between different parts of the North Sea, e.g. Danish, English and Norwegian sectors. 
There are also variations between different operator companies and sometimes even 
internally within the same operator company.3 
 
The data used in this study is collected from facilities on the Norwegian continental 
shelf. Design and operation of installations on the Norwegian continental shelf must 
comply with Norwegian laws and regulations according to the Norwegian Petroleum 
Safety Authority (PSA) /13/. 
 
In the Norwegian regulations there are no exact definitions as to when a platform 
should be designed as manned or normally unmanned. However, if facilities are 
designed for overnight stays (periodically manned platforms, PMI) there are 
additional requirements, compared to a NUI, that will make the platform more 
expensive to build and normally also to operate. From a strictly economic standpoint 
a NUI is often a preferred solution.4 However, as demonstrated in the thesis, 
helicopter traffic is a major risk driver which often leads to an equivalent facility 
designed for overnight stays to be a safer option. 
 
 
3.2.1 Example of a concept selection 
To give a clearer picture of the problem statement an example is presented below: 
 
                                                     
3 Communication with Mr. Roy-Atle Simonsen, Senior Safety Consultant at Oilconx Risk 
Solutions. 
4 Communication with Mr. Roy-Atle Simonsen, Senior Safety Consultant at Oilconx Risk 
Solutions. 
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Suppose we have a NUI in the same area as a large, manned, oil platform called an 
accommodation platform (AP). The maintenance work crew, called crew 1, is for 30 
days per year shuttled to the NUI to perform maintenance work for up to twelve hours 
each of those days and then flown back with the helicopter to the AP. These 
additional 60 helicopter flights per year will result in an increased risk level for crew 
1. The crew is not allowed to stay for more than twelve hours on the platform as it is 
not designed for them to stay any longer. 
 
Another option would be to design the platform to be a periodically manned 
installation (PMI), essentially a NUI with a living quarter (LQ). This would present 
the crew with a designated area for them to spend their resting time in while they 
were at the platform performing their work. Since this is just an example it is 
estimated that the work crew, called crew 2, with use of the LQ has to make six trips 
with each trip lasting five days. These days will be divided into twelve hours of work 
and twelve hours of resting time, resulting in the same total amount of work for both 
crew 1 and crew 2. Compared to the other option this one results in fewer helicopter 
trips (twelve against 60), however this option also comes with an increased risk to 
crew 2 due to them staying for longer periods of time on the platform. The extra time 
will be spent in the LQ; however it is not practically possible to design this LQ to 
reach the same low risk level as of the accommodation area on the AP where crew 1 
will spend their resting time.  Because of this crew 2 will be subjected to a greater 
risk level during their resting period than crew 1. 
 
Now the question becomes, which of the two crews will be exposed to the lowest 
total risk level? 
 
3.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to develop a coarse framework, a model, for risk-based 
concept selection of offshore platforms by comparison of potential loss of life (PLL) 
for different concepts. In more detail, the model will be based on historical data from 
the North Sea and use quantitative risk analytical methods to incorporate them in the 
decision-making process for concept selection of offshore oil platforms. 
 
The results of the model will be used to indicate, with regards to PLL, whether a NUI 
in the North Sea should be designed as a periodically manned platform, including 
living quarters, for overnight stays or designed without these facilities and instead 
rely on helicopter shuttling, see section 3.2.1 for an example of the problem 
statement. 
 
In chapter 9 the model will be used to estimate the risk between two fictitious 
concepts. This allows for greater transparency as to the workings of the model, but 
also as to how its results should be interpreted. However, that specific example is 
nothing more than an example. This master’s thesis constitutes the construction of the 
model itself, which can be used to generate the difference in risk between various 
different concepts of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea. 
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3.3.1 Potential 
For the results of the model to be useful they have to be presented in an early phase of 
the platform’s development. They have to be recognized early enough to be able to 
make a difference as to the design. This requirement however, also puts restrictions 
on the accuracy of the information and data used as a basis for the model. Since not 
all parameters will be known by the time of utilization of the model the interpretation 
of the results should reflect this. The results are thereby not meant to give an exact 
estimate of the actual risk level, but rather be used as a tool for comparison of 
alternative concepts and give valuable inputs to decision makers regarding how the 
different concepts rank safety wise, see chapter 9 for an example. 
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4 Basis of the model 
The reason for developing the model is that there is no common practice as of today 
on concept selection of normally unmanned installations with regards to designing 
them for overnight stays, see section 3.2. A model will allow for a more efficient 
process, as opposed to performing a new evaluation each time, since only the input 
parameters need to be case specific. Hence, a lot of work can be eliminated. It should 
be noted though, that it is important to make certain that the increase in efficiency 
does not lead to a decrease in the accuracy of the results. 
 
This model will present a generic way of accomplishing this concept selection based 
on a scientific foundation built on historical data. Most other decisions made in 
similar situations are based on standardized methods which, though they may be 
harder to change, improve the safety of the overall operations. There is no reason why 
this should not be the case for this type of concept selection. This study naturally does 
not present a fully operational standardized model through which the concept will be 
selected. However, as stated before, it presents a generic way of doing it that could be 
standardized. There is of course room for improvement, see section 10.1. 
 
4.1 Structure of the model 
The study will rely on the analysis of data found in various QRAs of offshore oil 
platforms in the North Sea, particularly unmanned installations in the Norwegian 
sector. Typically, the QRA addresses the individual risk, potential loss of life, fatal 
accident rate (FAR) and main contributors to these, e.g. ship collisions, helicopter 
accidents, impairment of escape routes and structural failures. Since the FAR of the 
entire installation is an averaged value of the entire platform reflecting the risk of 
fatalities among the exposed population the uncertainties are quite large. To achieve a 
better estimate of the risk, the platforms are divided into areas and the FAR values are 
calculated for the different areas (area-FAR) based on the function of the area. By 
doing this, different area-FAR values are assigned areas where there are a lot of 
process equipment and hydrocarbon flows compared to utility areas. Area-FAR 
values have been presented in all of the studied QRAs. When these area-FAR values 
are combined with a manning distribution it will give a better estimate of the number 
of fatalities in comparison to having a FAR value for the entire installation combined 
with the total number of visiting personnel. 
 
The generic model constructed in this study is based on these area-FAR values. An 
extensive survey has been performed to extract them from eleven QRAs of offshore 
oil platforms in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea. The mean value of each area 
has been used as a generic estimate of the risk level in that part of a generic offshore 
oil platform, see section 6.1. The manning distribution needed to calculate the 
expected number of fatalities is used as an input parameter, since this can vary 
between the types of personnel visiting the platform, e.g. to perform maintenance, 
wire-line operations, coil tubing operations. 
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In the same manner, QRAs of accommodation platforms were surveyed to extract 
information of the area-FAR for the accommodation section of an accommodation 
platform. The generic value chosen for the model was yet again calculated to be the 
mean value of those found in the QRAs, see section 6.2. 
 
Some parameters, e.g. flight distance, hours spent on platform for various types of 
work were found hard to estimate due to either time constraints or too great of a 
variance in the data to be used as point estimates in a generic model of this sort, see 
section 8.2. To circumvent this problem, they were instead used as inputs to the 
model, see section 8.2. The cut-off between parameters chosen as inputs and 
parameters chosen as generic point estimates were not evaluated beyond the point of 
availability, time constraints and expected results based on experience. The same 
reasons apply for the parameters not being subjected to review on whether they could 
be used as distribution instead of point estimates. With more time the different 
parameters would have been evaluated and suitably characterized as generically 
estimated values or as input parameters. This could have been done through statistical 
review of representative data coupled with sensitivity analyzes to see how the 
different parameters affected the results. What is also taken into account is how well 
the parameter is estimated at the time when this model is to be used. For instance, a 
parameter such as the flight distance, which is certainly known at the point in time 
when this model might be used, is unsuitable as a generic point estimate since it is 
known and no benefit would come from not using the true value. 
 
The last part of the construction of the model constituted incorporating the estimated 
helicopter flight risk. For this estimate to be suitable in a generic context it would 
have to reflect both the risk contributed by the distance of the flight as well as the 
number of flights, see chapter 7. 
 
4.2 Reason for the model’s structure 
For the model to work in a generic context in accordance with the study’s purpose in 
section 3.2 and exemplified in section 3.2.1, it has been based on comparable risk 
levels for the contribution of presence on the installation, presence in the 
accommodation area of the accommodation platform and the helicopter transports. 
These three major risk factors are the only ones taken into account since they are the 
only ones that differ for the different concept alternatives. The other major risk 
factors are; risk due to transfers on-/offshore, risk due to presence on other platforms 
and the risk due to transfers to these, risk due to other types of work or risk due to 
time spent onshore. These are assumed not to differ between the concept alternatives 
and are hence, not investigated further. In other words, the model only gives a delta 
risk, not the total risk picture. 
 
4.2.1 Risk due to presence on the NUI 
For this risk to be evaluated information with regards to the design of the area, types 
of equipment and their specifications and so forth would be needed. This information 
might not be available at the time of the concept selection; hence the choice of using 
historical data to estimate the risk level. To go into so much detail as to assign risks to 
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certain equipment and model it for different parameters such as number of wells and 
volumes/types of hydrocarbon flows was not possible due to this information not 
being available. Instead the risk levels were estimated and used in the form of area-
FAR values for other platforms, see section 4.1. These were found in the specific 
QRAs that were developed for each of the platforms. 
 
4.2.2 Risk due to rest on the AP 
See section 4.2.1. 
 
4.2.3 Risk due to helicopter transports 
For this risk to be evaluated historical data has to be used. No information on failure 
rates has been found in regards to quantitative risk analyzes such as fault trees. The 
level of detail was chosen with regards both to how well the data represents the actual 
scenarios as well as having a large enough data set to present accurate estimates. The 
data used in chapter 7 was chosen based on these factors and the level of detail 
chosen resulted in data specifically from offshore helicopter travels in the North Sea. 
It was not possible to make any distinctions in regards to more detailed information, 
e.g. weather conditions during the flights, helicopter brand/model, and experience 
level of the pilot. 
Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea 
 22 
 
5 Established constraints as to the foundation 
of the model 
This study is limited by the assumptions previously made in the sources this study is 
based on since it has not been practicable to verify them. 
 
5.1 QRAs, chapter 6. 
• The offshore platforms used to estimate the FAR values for the different 
areas are representative for those platforms the model is applied on. 
• The offshore platforms used to estimate a generic area-FAR value for the 
weather deck, utility area, well bay area, process area and sub cellar deck are 
assumed to be without their own drilling module. 
 
5.2 Helicopter flight accidents, chapter 7. 
• The study performed by SINTEF to estimate the relationship between flight 
time dependent helicopter accidents and helicopter accidents dependent on 
the number of flights is based on representative data /12/. 
• Only fatalities are taken into account when estimating the helicopter flight 
risk, all other forms of injuries are neglected. 
 
5.3 The model, chapter 8. 
• For a given concept scenario, the data on which the model was constructed is 
sufficiently representative for that specific scenario. 
• The following three major risk factors are the only ones taken into account; 
risk due to presence on the platform in question, risk due to the personnel’s 
rest taking place on an accommodation platform while work is performed on 
the platform in question, risk due to helicopter transfers to and from the 
platform in question. All other risk factors are deemed not to differ between 
the alternatives and are hence, not accounted for, see section 4.2.  
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6 Review of QRAs 
The review of the QRAs is an integral part of this study since the foundation of the 
model is based on the data found in these, see chapter 4 for the reasoning.  
 
6.1 Review of NUIs 
As described in section 4.1, the area-FAR values for the different areas in the model 
were all based on the mean values of the area-FAR values for same areas found in the 
QRAs. However, all the area distributions in the QRAs were not constructed in the 
same manner and with the same number of areas. The generic area distribution was a 
trade-off between a more detailed distribution with more areas but lower accuracy of 
the estimated value for each area and a distribution with a less detailed distribution 
with fewer areas but a greater accuracy of the estimated value for each area. The 
generic distribution of the model was chosen to have the lowest amount of areas, but 
with no merging of areas with different functionalities whatsoever. This meant that 
different types of utility areas were merged to result in as much data as possible to be 
used in the estimates, as these were thought to be similar enough to be merged. 
However, no areas with different functions e.g. a utility area and a process area, were 
merged as to not taint the integrity of the distribution. The generic distribution used in 
the model, chosen with the least amount of areas but without clashing functionalities 
within an area, is presented below:5 
 
• Weather deck 
- Including crane 
• Utility area 
- Including central control room (CCR), local electrical room (LER), heating, 
venting and air conditioning (HVAC) plant, emergency shelter, telecom room and 
possible living quarters (LQ) 
• Well bay area 
- Including well head area, Christmas tree area, test manifold and high integrity 
pressure protection system (HIPPS) 
• Process area 
Including gas treatment area, separation area and pigging facilities. 
• Sub cellar deck 
- Including areas for knock out drums, drain tanks, drain pumps and sea water lift 
pumps. 
 
                                                     
5 The distribution was chosen with inputs from Mr. Roy-Atle Simonsen, Senior Safety 
Consultant at Oilconx Risk Solutions. 
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Figure 6-1 Schematic drawing of the area distribution applied in the model 
 
This area distribution resulted in the lowest number of areas, for greatest accuracy of 
each area-FAR, without areas clearly clashing in regards to the function and risk level 
of the different areas. 
 
The area distributions found in the QRAs did not fit this model exactly though and 
had to be conformed accordingly. They either did not have all five areas, in which 
case the areas they did have were used. In the other case, where there was a more 
detailed distribution, areas with similar functions were merged through the averaging 
of their respective area-FAR values. Because of this, information was lost in 
accordance with the earlier arguments on the averaging of area-FARs in section 4.1. 
This was still carried out though, since the alternative of using a more detailed 
distribution would exclude a large number of the QRAs, hence lowering the accuracy 
of the generic estimate. This due to the fact that if there are several smaller areas in a 
detailed distribution with unknown area-FAR values and one larger area in a QRA 
with a known area-FAR value, that constitutes the mean of these smaller areas, it is 
not possible to estimate the area-FAR values of the smaller areas. In other words, it is 
not possible to reverse a mean value to calculate the values that resulted in the mean 
value. Of course, the mean of the larger area’s area-FAR values could simply be 
evenly split, i.e. remain the same, for the smaller areas. However, there was not 
enough data to support performing such an action. In addition, a less detailed area 
distribution suits the uncertainties of the model in a better manner. 
  
To create better estimates with this model more time should be spent on studies where 
parameters, e.g. installation year, size, manning levels were analyzed to see if they 
had an impact on the FAR values. If such connections were established the mean 
values of merged FAR values should be suitably weighted. To better cope with the 
uncertainties distributions can replace the point estimates. These would have to be 
verified with regards to their compliance with the data to ensure suitability. 
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The mean FAR-values of the areas in the generic area distribution are presented in 
Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1 Summary of the area FARs used in the model 
Area: FAR (Fatalities per 1*108 exposed hours): 
Weather deck 4.16 
Utility area 3.11 
Well bay area 8.02 
Process area 5.74 
Sub cellar deck 6.32 
 
6.2 Review of accommodation platforms 
As described in section 4.1, the risk level contributed by time spent on the 
accommodation area of the accommodation platform in the generic model will also be 
estimated through the calculation of a mean value from the QRAs of offshore 
accommodation platforms in the Norwegian section of the North Sea. To improve the 
estimate, see the comments of the last passage in section 6.1. No additional 
calculations were needed, with regards to different area distributions being used, since 
the accommodation area was clearly separated in the area distributions of all the 
platforms and never further divided into more detailed sections. Three 
accommodation platforms were used to estimate a generic FAR value for the 
accommodation area, see Table 6-2.  
 
Table 6-2 the generic area-FAR value for the accommodation section of the 
accommodation platform used in the model. 
Area: FAR (Fatalities per 1*108 exposed hours): 
Accommodation area 1.66 
 
6.3 Validation of the data 
The QRAs are developed by a third party and the estimates, results and assumptions 
are then reviewed by the operator. For newly built platforms the QRA might also be 
subjected to review by the engineering contractor6. There were certain restrictions as 
to the presentation of the data used to estimate the area-FAR values in this chapter, 
though not with regards to the utilization of the data to generate the estimates 
presented in the chapter. 
                                                     
6 Communication with Mr. Roy-Atle Simonsen, Senior Safety Consultant at Oilconx Risk 
Solutions. 
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7 Review of helicopter flight risk 
The review of the helicopter flight risk is an integral part of this study since it is a 
main contributor to risk in any of the studied QRAs, and it is not uncommon for it to 
be the number one risk contributor to the personnel. The reason for evaluating it in 
this manner can, in addition to this chapter itself, be found in section 4.2.3. 
 
7.1 Method for estimating the helicopter flight risk 
For this study to be used in a general context it is very important to consider how the 
helicopter flight risk is related to the flight time and the number of flights. Some 
accidents are dependent on the flight time, others are dependent on the number of 
flights and some are dependent on both. The estimate of the helicopter flight risk must 
reflect this relationship or it will generate biases with regards to less infrequent but 
longer flights as opposed to more frequent but shorter flights. 
 
A method, as described above, has previously been used by OGP (International 
Association of Oil & Gas Producers) and is presented below. 
 
Individual risk (IR) per journey = In-flight IR + Take-off & landing (TO/L) IR 
 
In-flight IR = Accident frequency in-flight (per hour) × Flight time (hours) × 
Probability of fatal accident × Nr. of fatalities in a fatal accident 
 
TO/L IR = Accident frequency in TO/L (per flight stage) × No of flight stages 
per journey × Probability of fatal accident × Nr. of fatalities in a fatal accident 
 
/11/ 
 
7.2 Dependencies on the flight time and the flight frequency  
SINTEF performed an extensive helicopter safety study where they reviewed 
helicopter flights logs for the North Sea from 1990-1998 to determine to what extent 
the helicopter accidents were related to the flight time and the number of flights 
respectively /12/. This was done through a model where helicopter I/As 
(Incidents/Accidents) were divided into eight different categories which are defined 
to be exhaustive and mutually excluding /12/. 
 
A1: Accident during take-off or landing at heliport/airport [Heliport] 
Accidents which occur after passengers have boarded the helicopter and 
before TPD (Takeoff Decision Point) or after LDP (Landing Decision Point) 
and before passengers have left the heliport/airport. 
A2: Accident during take-off or landing on helideck [Helideck] 
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Accidents which occur after passengers have boarded the helicopter and 
before TDP (Takeoff Decision Point) or after LDP (Landing Decision Point) 
and before passengers have left the helideck. 
A3: Accident caused by critical failure in helicopter during flight [System 
failure] 
Accident caused by critical system failure in the helicopter after TDP (Take-off 
Decision Point) and before LDP (Landing Decision Point), for example in the 
main rotor, tail rotor, engine, gearbox, etc. When a critical system failure 
occurs, the craft (pilots/passengers) can only be saved through a successful 
emergency landing. 
A4: Collision with another aircraft [Mid-air collision] 
Collision with another aircraft during flight, without any critical failure 
occurring. (Mid-Air Collision; MAC) 
A5: Controlled flight into terrain, sea or building [Terrain collision] 
Accident caused by collision into terrain, sea, or building after TDP (Take-off 
Decision Point) and before LDP (Landing Decision Point), with no critical 
failure occurring. (Controlled Flight Into Terrain, sea or building; CFIT) 
A6: Accident with risk for persons in the helicopter [Person inside] 
Accident involving danger to persons (pilots/passengers) located in the 
helicopter, for example caused by toxic gases due to a baggage or cargo fire. 
A7: Accident with danger for persons outside helicopter [Person outside] 
Accident involving danger to persons (pilot/passengers) located outside the 
helicopter, for example, the tail rotor strikes a person. (Note that danger to 
other persons than helicopter pilots and passengers, for example helideck 
personnel, is not included.) 
A8: Accident caused by weather conditions, surrounding environment, or 
other [Other/unknown] 
Accident caused by weather conditions (for example lightning strike), 
surrounding environment (for example collision with a vehicle at the 
heliport/airport), or other (for example an act of terror), in addition to 
accidents with unknown causes. 
 
Citation from /12/ 
 
The distribution of the accidents into these eight categories for evaluation of each 
category’s contribution to the helicopter flight accident frequency was based both on 
historical data and expert evaluations /12/. For determining how each category’s 
accident frequency relates to the flight time and number of flights respectively a 
factor is introduced, flight quantity dependence, in accordance with the approach in 
various QRAs. The factor is defined as 100% when accidents occur on or in the 
immediate vicinity of the helideck representing a complete dependence on the number 
of flights. The value 0% is defined as accidents occurring in mid-air and represents a 
complete dependence on the flight time. The results of the different categories are the 
summarized to give an estimate of the extent to which flight time and the number of 
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flights contribute to the total accident rate. A summary of the above described method 
is represented in Table 7-1.  
 
Table 7-1 Summary of how the flight time and the number of flights contribute to the 
overall flight frequency respectively. 
Accident 
category 
Helicopter 
flight 
accident 
frequency 
/12/ 
Flight 
quantity 
dependency 
Contribution 
to the flight 
time 
dependent 
frequency 
Contribution 
to frequency 
dependent on 
the number 
of flights 
A1 6.7 % 100 % 0 % 6.7 % 
A2 32.9 % 100 % 0 % 32.9 % 
A3 38.1 % 50 % 19.0 % 19.0 % 
A4 0.7 % 0 % 0.7 % 0 % 
A5 9.7 % 50 % 4.9 % 4.9 % 
A6 0.8 % 0 % 0.8 % 0 % 
A7 5.4 % 100 % 0 % 5.4 % 
A8 5.7 % 25% 4.3% 1.4 % 
Sum 100 % - 29.7% 70.3 % 
 
As seen in the table above the helicopter accident frequency can be coarsely 
accounted for by attributing 30% of the accidents to be flight time dependent and 
70% to be dependent on the number of flights. 
 
7.3 Review of helicopter flight information 
The helicopter safety study prepared by SINTEF /12/ has not been used to estimate 
the helicopter accident rates since it is not specified what number of flights the data is 
based on. As previously stated this is a requirement to be able to utilize the method in 
the example presented in section 3.2.1, hence other data sources have been 
investigated. 
 
OGP has annually released reports on performance of helicopter operations in the oil 
and gas industry from 1994 to 2006 (/3/; /4/; /5/; /6/; /7/; /8/; /9/; /10/). The data in 
these reports are well suited for this study not only because they present their accident 
data in reference both to the flight time and the number of flights made, but the data is 
also presented for the North Sea alone which is appropriate for this study since 
regional differences does not have to be accounted for. It also represents accidents in 
the offshore industry alone which further validates the estimates since there could be 
sectional differences between different sectors. However, it should be noted that the 
helicopter accident data, presented in Table 7-2 is based on very few accidents, 
making its use restricted due to the sensitivity of the data with regards to the number 
of reported accidents. These estimates will then have to be complemented by the 
conditional probability of a fatal accident and the proportion of fatalities in a fatal 
accident in order to present the helicopter flight risk.  
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Table 7-2 Helicopter accident rates for the North Sea from 1994 to 2006. 
Period Accident rate (per 100 000 
hours flown) 
Accident rate (per 100 000 
flight stages) 
1994 /3/ 0 0 
1995 /3/ 1.65 0.85 
1996 /3/ 1.26 1.20 
1997 /3/ 1.78 1.08 
1998 /3/ 0.61 0.39 
1999 /4/ 1.37 0.74 
2000 /4/ 0.68 0.41 
2001 /5/ 1.23 0.82 
2002 /6/ 1.96 1.09 
2003 /7/ 0 0 
2004 /8/ 0 0 
2005 /9/ 0 0 
2006 /10/ 1.45 1.01 
Mean 0.92 0.58 
 
According to the earlier assumptions the results from Table 7-2 will be adjusted 
according to the results from Table 7-1 in order to give the estimated helicopter 
accident rate that reflects the relation between flight time and the number of flights 
made. The results are displayed in Table 7-3. 
 
Table 7-3 Adjusted helicopter accident rates for the North Sea 
 Adjusted accident rate (per 100 000 
hours flown) 
Adjusted accident rate (per 100 000 
flight stages) 
 0.27 0.41 
 
The conditional probability of a fatal accident and the proportion of fatalities in a fatal 
accident are not presented in the reports used above to retrieve an estimate of the 
accident rate. However, they have been estimated in another OGP report, /11/, and are 
presented below in Table 7-4. 
 
Table 7-4 OGP estimates of North Sea offshore helicopter parameters, /11/. 
 Probability of Fatal 
Accident 
Probability of death in a 
fatal accident 
Flight time dependent  0.20 0.85 
Dependent on the flight 
frequency 
0.17 0.48 
 
A summary of the important estimates in this chapter is presented in Table 7-5. 
 
Table 7-5 Summary of the parameters used to estimate the helicopter flight risk 
Flight time 
dependent 
Accident rate (per 
100 000 hours 
flown) 
Probability of a 
Fatal Accident 
Proportion of 
fatalities in a fatal 
accident 
 0.27 0.20 0.85 
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Flight 
frequency 
dependent 
Accident rate (per 
100 000 flight 
stages) 
Probability of a 
Fatal Accident 
Proportion of 
fatalities in a fatal 
accident 
 0.41 0.17 0.48 
 
The helicopter flight risk is then estimated in accordance with the method described 
in section 7.1. 
 
7.4 Validation of the method 
This method is used in various QRAs (performed by different companies), and these 
QRAs are then reviewed by the operating companies and sometimes by a third party. 
There were certain restrictions as to the presentation of certain information in this 
chapter, though not with regards to the utilization of this information. 
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8 The model 
The model’s purpose is in answer to the lack of common practice of performing a 
concept selection of normally unmanned installations, see section 3.2 and the example 
in section 3.2.1.The results are presented as the difference in risk between the two 
alternatives and cannot be used in evaluations with regards to acceptance criteria 
based on a person’s total risk exposure. 
 
It should be noted yet again that since the model is based on data from the North Sea 
the representativeness could be quite poor for other parts of the world and caution 
should be taken with regards to this context. 
 
8.1 Structure of the model 
The actual model itself is built on the data analyzed through chapters 6 and 7 and with 
inputs according to section 8.2. The connections are made as to make the different 
risks comparable, i.e. of the same form. The model is currently constructed in an 
Excel-file7, which allows for additions or for changes to be made to the construction 
or/and content. The reason for the input parameters to be used as input and not be 
generically estimated or the reason for them being parameters in the model at all can, 
in addition to section 8.2 below, be found in section 4.1. The model presents the 
results of PLLs for both alternatives, e.g. shuttling option or a campaign option. 
However, the results are not quantitatively interpreted in that manner, but according 
to section 3.3.1 only together with a qualitative evaluation of the model’s effect on 
the results in that particular case used to indicate which alternative would present the 
lowest risk level to the crew, see chapter 9 for an example. 
 
8.2 Input parameters 
The parameters in this section are a part of the model due to the fact that they are 
needed to re-calculate the risks of the personnel being present at the platform, chapter 
6, and of the personnel being transferred by helicopter, chapter 7, to PLL. These risks 
are then comparable and the total risk for the two different alternatives (NUI+AP vs. 
PMI) can be calculated, compared and the concept evaluated. PLL is frequently used 
in the oil business as a risk measure. 
 
The input parameters are divided into one of two segments due to the nature of the 
crew’s visit. The first one is 12 hour operations; the second one is 24 hour operations. 
This separation is due to the fact that certain operations such as coil tubing or wire-
line may require the crew to work non-stop for 24 hours on end. In other words, some 
operations require continuous efforts and cannot be paused. Regular maintenance 
work on the other hand is more flexible and operations of this nature can be paused 
after 12 hours and resumed after the crew’s resting period. The split of these 12 hour 
and 24 hour operations is motivated by the possibility of its effect on the input 
                                                     
7 Microsoft Office, Excel, 2010 
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parameters. The values of manning distribution, persons in the helicopter and so on, 
will vary depending on the type of operation and the split was made to reflect this in 
the model. There could still have been just the one alternative, where a mean value 
was estimated, but the division increases the transparency of the model which in turn 
makes it less likely to be misinterpreted. 
 
8.2.1 Manning distribution 
The manning distribution will easily be estimated with input from the operators at the 
company assigned to operate similar platforms. Since this is available information at 
the time of utilization of this model and the fact that the parameter value varies, the 
manning distribution is deemed better suited as an input parameter than a generic 
point estimate. The manning distribution will be put into the model in the form of 
fractions, where a number 1 for a certain area would signify the whole crew spending 
all of their time in that area. 
 
8.2.2 Time spent on the platform 
The time spent on the platform should be estimated with input from the operators at 
the company assigned to operate similar platforms, in the same way as the manning 
distribution. Since this is available information from similar platforms at the time of 
utilization of this model and the fact that the parameter value varies, the time spent on 
the platforms is deemed better suited as an input parameter than a generic point 
estimate. The time spent on the platform will be put into the model in the form of a 
specified number of hours of presence on the platform per trip and per person. The 
number of trips per year and the number of persons per trip will also be put in the 
model. 
 
8.2.3 Persons in the helicopter 
When the operators estimate the two previously described parameters the number of 
persons in the helicopter will be estimated in the process. There is no reason not to 
use this estimate since it certainly will be at least as accurate as any generic value or 
distribution that could be estimated at this time. 
 
8.2.4 Flights per year 
The number of flights per year will greatly affect the risk level contributed by the 
helicopter accidents and can vary quite a bit since different types of installations may 
require additional attention from a work crew. This is also easily estimated by input 
from the operators at the company assigned to operate the platform and hence better 
suited as an input parameter. The number of helicopter flights per year will be put 
into the model in the form of an integer. The integer will represent all flights and not 
the number of operations, that is to say an operation requiring one flight to the 
platform and one flight back from the platform will be noted as two flights. However, 
it should be noted that only flights transporting crew are accounted for. Trips with just 
the pilot are not taken into account, even if they are a result of the personnel visiting 
the platform. This is since the model only accounts for the risk the work crews are 
exposed to. 
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8.2.5 The flight time 
The flight time affects the risk contributed by the helicopter transfers since this is 
dependent both on the number of flights and the time spent in flight mode for each 
flight. The time can vary quite a bit, and due to this it is unsuitable to be used as a 
generic point estimate. More so than this, the fact that it certainly will be known at the 
time when this model will be used makes it obsolete in regards to being a generic 
point estimate. The flight time will be put into the model in the form of hours. It is 
presented for every flight. That is to say for an operation requiring two flights there 
will be two flight times. 
 
8.3 Model description 
The model is constructed to use input parameters concerning the helicopter flight risk 
together with the estimated risk parameters to result in two PLL values, i.e. per trip 
and per year, see section 8.3.1.1 below. This is done for both the “NUI+AP”-
alternative and the “PMI”-alternative. 
 
The next part utilizes the input parameters regarding the risk due to presence on the 
platform together with the estimated parameters also regarding risk due to presence 
on the platform, see section 8.3.1.2 below. This results in two PLL values, i.e. per trip 
and per year, and it is also done for both of the alternatives. 
 
The PLL values due to the helicopter flights and presence at the platform are 
comparable, i.e. of the same form, and are consequently added for each of the 
“NUI+AP”-alternative and the “PMI”-alternative. This results in total PLL values, 
both per trip and per year, for each of the alternatives which are then compared to 
evaluate which of the two alternatives, i.e. “NUI+AP”-alternative or “PMI”-
alternative, are exposing the crew to the highest level of risk. 
  
8.3.1 Structure of the sheets calculating PLL for the two alternatives 
Since the risk is calculated in the same manner for both of the alternatives, the 
description in the following two sections is valid for both cases. 
8.3.1.1 The helicopter flight risk part 
The first section calculates the PLL contributed by the helicopter transfer. It utilizes 
the elements specified in Table 8-1. 
 
Table 8-1 Elements used in the helicopter flight risk part of the model 
Description: Classification: 
Data from Table 7-5 Generic estimates 
Persons in the helicopter Input parameter 
Flights per year Input parameter 
Time per flight (hours) Input parameter 
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The data and the input parameters in Table 8-1 are used according to the equation in 
section 7.1. The results are presented as PLL per trip (back and forth) and PLL per 
year. 
 
8.3.1.2 The presence on the platform part 
The second section calculates the PLL contributed by the crew being at the platform, 
which includes the crew resting at the accommodation section of the AP in one of the 
alternatives. It utilizes the elements specified in Table 8-2. 
 
Table 8-2 Elements used in the presence at the platform part 
Description: Classification: 
Data from Table 6-1 Generic estimates 
Data from Table 6-2 Generic estimate 
Manning distribution Input parameter 
Time spent on the platform Input parameter 
 
The data and input parameters in Table 8-2 are then used to estimate the PLL per trip 
and per year. The generic area-FAR estimates are first conformed to the unit per hour 
instead of per 100 million hours, whereupon they are multiplied respectively with the 
corresponding value in the manning distribution. Each area value is then multiplied 
with the number of exposed hours at the platform both per trip and per year. Lastly, 
these are then added to each other to present the result in PLL per trip and year due to 
presence on the platform. 
 
 
8.4 Outputs 
The model presents PLLs for each of the two alternatives (NUI+AP vs. PMI); see 
section 3.2 and the example in section 3.2.1.  These PLLs represent the estimated 
number of fatalities for each of the alternatives for different periods of time, e.g. per 
trip and per year. This allows for comparisons between the alternatives, with regards 
to the risk level the personnel are exposed to. However, the PLLs are not 
representative of the total risk level the crew is exposed to. The model does not take 
into account other risk factors that are not affected by this concept selection, namely 
the risk due to onshore/offshore helicopter transfers, time spent on other offshore 
platforms including transfers to these or other locations than the NUI/PMI platform 
and the accommodation area of the AP or the risk due to the crew being onshore. For 
the results to be interpreted in that manner, these other risk contributing factors have 
to be added to the model’s results. 
 
Caution should be used even when the results are used in the correct manner, i.e. as 
the difference in risk between the two alternatives. Rather than using them in their 
presented quantitative context they should be qualitatively used to indicate which 
alternative is the better in this context, i.e. exposes the crew to the lowest risk. They 
should in no way be misconstrued as exact estimates of the risk difference between 
the two alternatives. The uncertainties are on too large of a scale for that sort of 
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operations due to the generic nature of the model coupled with the sacrifices made to 
allow for it to present results in an early phase of the platform’s development. It is 
therefore extremely important that the results are evaluated with regards to how they 
have been affected by the necessary sacrifices made on the model’s accuracy. These 
matters are further discussed in the last two chapters of this study. 
 
It should be duly noted that the model is unfit to be used for other geographical 
regions than the North Sea. Evaluations of how the representativeness of the data the 
model is based upon corresponds with the data from other regions should be coupled 
with the results if it is to still be used 
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9 Risk-based concept selection 
For clarification on both how to use the model and how to interpret the results an 
example is given in section 9.1. As mentioned in section 8.4 the importance of 
understanding how to interpret the model’s results cannot be overstated. They are in 
no way meant to be interpreted in a quantitative context as an exact estimation of the 
difference in risk between the two alternatives but only in a qualitative manner to 
indicate the better option with regards to the lowest risk level. 
 
9.1 Example 
The input parameters are given credible but fictitious values, the model will be run 
and the results will be presented and discussed. 
 
9.1.1 Input parameters 
The estimated input parameter values are, as discussed in section 8.2, estimated for 
both 12 hour operations, e.g. maintenance work, and 24 hour operations, e.g. coil 
tubing operations, wire-line operations. They have been given fictitious values which 
are deemed credible based on the experience gained through all of the QRA work. 
The estimated input parameter values are presented in Table 9-1 and Table 9-2 for the 
“NUI+AP”-alternative and the “PMI”-alternative respectively. 
 
9.1.1.1 The “NUI+AP”-alternative 
 
The numbers of flights per year are based on an assumed work load of 96 days of “12 
hour operations” and 24 days of “24 hour operations”. The distributions of visits are 
24 periods with four days in each for the “12 hour operations” and three periods with 
eight days in each for the “24 hour operations”. For the “12 hour operations” the crew 
is assumed to be transferred to the platform for twelve hours of work during the day 
after which they are transported back to the accommodation platform to rest for the 
next twelve hours. This goes on for four days after which there is a break until the 
next four day period. Since the “24 hour operations”-crews have to work continuously 
for eight days the crews work in shifts. One crew arrives and works for twelve hours 
after which it is relieved by another crew and transported back to the accommodation 
platform for twelve hours of rest.  
 
A trip is defined as the two flights used to transport the crew to and back from the 
platform. 
 
Table 9-1 All estimated input parameter values used in the example for the “NUI+AP”-
alternative 
Input parameter: 12 hour operations: 24 hour operations: 
Persons in helicopter 12 10 
Flights per year 192 96 
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Time per flight (hours) 0.33 0.33 
Weather deck 0.03 0.03 
Utility area 0.15 0.05 
Process area 0.15 0.20 
Well bay area 0.15 0.20 
Sub-cellar deck 0.02 0.02 
Accommodation area of 
the AP 
0.5 0.5 
Hours at the platform 
per trip 
23.34 23.34 
Number of trips per year 96 48 
Number of persons per 
trip 
12 10 
 
9.1.1.2 The “PMI”-alternative 
The numbers of flights per year are based on the same assumed work load as for the 
“NUI+AP”-alternative for them to be comparable. That is to say 96 days of “12 hour 
operations” and 24 days of “24 hour operations” per year. For the “12 hour 
operations” the crew is assumed to work at the PMI in periods of four days resulting 
in 24 annual trips. Typically, a workday consists of the whole crew, twelve persons, 
working their twelve hours during the day and resting during the night. For the “24 
hour operations” though, the 24 days are divided into three trips of eight days each. 
20 people are transferred to the platform and they work in shifts where ten of them 
rest for twelve hours while the other ten work for twelve hours. This goes on for eight 
days until all of the personnel leave the platform. 
 
A trip is defined as the two flights used to transport the crew to and back from the 
platform. 
 
Table 9-2 All estimated input parameter values used in the example for the “PMI”-
alternative 
Input parameter: 12 hour operations: 24 hour operations: 
Persons in helicopter 12 20 
Flights per year 48 6 
Time per flight (hours) 0.33 0.33 
Weather deck 0.03 0,03 
Utility area 0.65 0.55 
Process area 0.15 0.20 
Well bay area 0.15 0.20 
Sub-cellar deck 0.02 0.02 
Accommodation area of 
the AP 
- - 
Hours at the platform 
per trip 
95.34 191.43 
Number of trips per year 24 3 
Number of persons per 12 20 
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trip 
 
9.1.2 Calculations 
The calculations are presented in chapter 13 Appendix A with snapshots of the Excel 
file and descriptive text as to how the calculations have been performed. 
 
9.1.3 Results 
The results are presented in the form of PLL for each of the alternatives, i.e. 
“NUI+AP”-alternative and “PMI”-alternative. They are presented both per trip and 
per year, but for the alternatives to be comparable the focus is on the PLL per year. It 
should be noted yet again that these results does not represent the total annual PLL of 
the crew but only account for the parts that differ between the two alternatives. For a 
complete risk picture other contributions have to be accounted for, see section 8.4. 
The results in this example, generated through the use of the input parameters 
presented in section 9.1.1 are presented below in Table 9-3 and Table 9-4. 
 
Table 9-3 the results of the example set forth in chapter 9 
 “NUI+AP” “PMI” 
PLL per trip 4.08e-5 2.58e-4 
PLL per year 4.59e-3 2.39e-3 
 
The results presented in Table 9-3 are not to be used as quantitative estimates of the 
risk since not enough is known about the uncertainties but rather as a qualitative 
indicator, see Table 9-4.  
 
Table 9-4 the results of the example set forth in chapter 9 
 “NUI+AP”/”PMI” 
PLL per year 1.92 
 
As seen in Table 9-4 the PLL for the “NUI+AP”-alternative is almost twice as large 
as the PLL for the “PMI”-alternative. 
 
Since the results, as previously discussed, are too uncertain to be used in their 
quantitative context they are presented as the quotient of the alternatives which 
indicates that there is a substantial difference between them, favoring the PMI. 
Coupled with an evaluation on how the construction of the model has affected the 
results a recommendation could be made. The recommendation could be to either 
suggest one of the alternatives or that there is a need for further evaluation to be able 
to safely base the concept selection on those evaluations. 
 
For the model to be used without additional evaluations certain improvements have to 
be made. These are discussed in section in chapter 10. 
 
To say something about the uncertainty in this case, the model was altered and the 
same concepts were compared two more times. In the first case the area-FAR values 
used in the model were all changed from being the mean values of the generic data to 
Concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the North Sea 
 39 
be the minimum FAR values found for each area. The second time around they were 
changed to be the maximum FAR value found for each of the areas. The results are 
presented in Table 9-5. 
 
Table 9-5 Results of the example when the area-FAR values have been altered 
 “NUI+AP”/”PMI” 
PLL per year, minimum area-FAR 
values instead of mean values 
2.57 
PLL per year, maximum area-FAR 
values instead of mean values 
1.48 
 
When one uses the extreme area-FAR values, i.e. the smallest and largest 
respectively, the generated result represents the largest and smallest difference in risk 
between the two concepts. Since both of the generated results clearly state that the 
“NUI+AP”-alternative will expose the crew to the largest risk it is safe to say that the 
uncertainty of the area-FAR values, in this case, is not large enough to make a 
difference as to which concept is the most dangerous. A quick verification performed 
in this manner is not enough to account for the uncertainty in the model. It can 
however be enough to show that the uncertainty of the model’s results coming from 
only averaging the area-FAR values will not affect which concept the model presents 
as the one exposing the crew to the largest risk. It should be noted though, that the 
results of this verification are only valid for this particular concept selection. 
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10 Discussion 
This discussion aims to examine the findings in the study, make judgments on these 
as well as clarify the proposed future work and research that would benefit this study. 
 
10.1 The model 
A model will allow for a more efficient process, as opposed to performing a new 
evaluation each time, since only the input parameters need to be case specific. Hence 
a lot of work can be eliminated. It should be noted though, that it is important to make 
certain that the increase in efficiency does not lead to a decrease in the accuracy of 
the results. 
 
The model was constructed to incorporate historical data and a systematic approach to 
the concept selection of normally unmanned offshore oil platforms and possibly to be 
used as a building block for further standardization, see section 3.2.1 for an 
exemplification of the problem statement. As discussed in section 3.2 there is no 
standardized way of performing this kind of selection as of today.  
 
Since the model is based on historical data the amount of data and the 
representativeness of this data are fundamental for the model to generate reliable 
estimates. The data, as of this study, are presented in chapters 6 and 7 according to 
current restrictions. Essentially though, it is based on the estimates of 14 QRAs and 
historical failure data of offshore helicopters in the North Sea from 1994-2006 curtsey 
of OGP. 
 
For the generated estimates of the model to become more accurate the basis of the 
model needs to become more accurate. In other words more data is needed. Not just 
any data though, it is necessary to always weigh the amount of data against the 
representativeness of the data, and inherently the scope of the model. The 
representativeness is closely related to various parameters.  
 
Below, a case is made for how geographical and cultural similarities between the data 
of the installations used to construct the model and the installation for which the 
concept selection is performed will affect the outcome. The model might for instance 
present different estimates when based on data from a certain geographical area and 
used for a concept selection in the same area compared to it being based on a larger 
data set collected from all over the world, but still used for the same concept selection 
in the same geographical area as before. The same can be said for cultural differences 
where a model based on data from one operator company and used for a concept 
selection within the company can present different estimates compared to a model 
based on a larger data set from several different operator companies, but the same 
concept selection within the same operator company. The same can be said about the 
data being representative with regards to the age of the data. Since the technology, 
equipment and procedures are constantly evolving and changing the model’s 
estimates will be prone to changes due to the data used with regards to the age of the 
data. 
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These factors could be probably accounted for through the utilization of Bayesian 
methods, see section 10.3. 
 
The accuracy of the model is not only dependent on the representativeness of the data 
with regards to previously discussed parameters. The level of detail used is also very 
important for the model to present accurate estimates. On one hand there is the risk of 
being on the platform, and on the other the risk of traveling to and from the platform. 
The risk of being on the platform has been estimated by the use of area-FAR values, 
see chapter 6. Since the area distribution was constructed differently for the various 
platforms used to generate data the ones that did not fit the model were conformed 
accordingly. This was done so that the generic distribution had the minimal amount of 
areas, but no merging of areas with clashing functions and risk levels accordingly. 
The minimum amount of areas, inherently resulting in the maximum amount of 
useable data, and the fact that there were no clashes in area functionalities resulted in 
an optimal accuracy of the estimates. However, it shall be noted that the data set was 
quite small. 
 
The size of the data set is not the only place for improvement though. The area-FAR 
values for different platforms were merged through mean values and used in the form 
of point estimates. By doing this, there are uncertainties left that are not properly 
accounted for, and these are of course also present in the results. To account for these 
uncertainties in some way, various distributions could be evaluated to see if the data 
would fit any of them and through this better account for the uncertainties, see section 
10.3.  
 
The input parameters were chosen with regards to the data the model was constructed 
from and the fact that a comparison was to be performed between the alternatives. For 
a comparison to be made the amount of work performed on the platform had to be the 
same for both of the alternatives. Since the difference was more helicopter flights but 
a safer resting area for one of the crews compared to fewer helicopter flights but a 
more dangerous resting area for the other crew it was determined that the same 
amount of theoretical personnel were to work in both of the alternatives. This would 
eliminate errors where the difference in flight would not be representative for the two 
alternatives. 
 
Since there is a difference in the number of trips, and inherently the flight time 
between the two alternatives, the comparison was chosen to take place per year. This 
could have been altered to compare the difference in risk for a certain work to be 
performed or for the difference in risk for the entire lifetime of the platform. The 
model is built for easy reconstruction in any part whether it is in regards to removing, 
adding or changing content. 
 
10.2 The applicability of the model 
The first thing to note about the model is that it is solely based on data from the North 
Sea and caution should be taken when used for concept selection of installations in 
other parts of the world. If the model is used anyway, the results should be coupled 
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with an evaluation as to the representativeness of the data that was used to construct 
the model, compared with the data from that region. 
 
The second thing to note about the model is that it does not present results of the risk 
the personnel is exposed to, for instance during a year. Due to this the results are unfit 
to be used in any kind of way with regards to comparing them to acceptance criteria 
to evaluate whether the personnel are exposed to high levels of risk. The reason for 
this is that the model only accounts for factors that differ between the two alternatives 
since it is designed to compare these alternatives, i.e. “NUI+AP” or “PMI”. Other risk 
factors that add to the overall exposure of the personal, namely helicopter transfers 
on- and offshore, time spent performing other types of work on other platforms or 
other locations or time spent onshore are not taken into account. All other risk factors 
exposing the crew to some type of risk would have to be added to the risk level 
presented by the model to generate a complete risk level comparable to suitable 
acceptance criteria. However, the model’s results are unsuitable to be a part of such 
evaluations due to the model’s unknown uncertainty. 
 
Because of the relatively small sample size and fact that no statistical inference was 
used to derive the generic point estimates used a basis for the model the uncertainties 
are not only unknown, but probably also quite large. The model’s results should 
therefore be used with caution. The model’s results are supposed to be used as a 
qualitative indication of the difference in risk. The qualitative aspect of the utilization 
though will instead present information such as: 
 
“Is there a difference in risk between the alternatives and if so which alternative is 
preferred with regards to the personnel risk?” 
 
and 
 
“Is the difference in risk between the alternatives, small, large or very large?” 
 
The qualitative results should be coupled with an additional evaluation to make 
certain that neither the construction of the model nor the data it is based upon will 
lead to poorly estimated results. Particularly the representativeness of data should be 
considered as discussed in section 10.1 due to the inherent dependencies between the 
accuracy of the model’s results and the data used for the construction of it. If no 
contradictions or faults due to poor representativeness are found with the model, its 
results can be used as arguments in the concept selection of the platform. If this is to 
be the case though, it is well worth noting that the model does not take any other 
factors into consideration but the personnel risk whether they are economic, 
environmental or of other sorts. 
 
Instead of performing a thorough analysis, an uncertainty verification as the one 
performed in section 9.1.3, can be an alternative. The idea is that when there is reason 
to believe that the method of handling the data is not reliable enough the extreme 
values of the data can be used to generate the extreme results. If both the maximum 
results and the minimum results indicate the same outcome, one can argue that it does 
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not matter that the method used to handle the data is not reliable enough since the 
results will show the same outcome anyway. This method can of course only be used 
semi-quantitatively since you will receive an interval in which you can argue that 
your result will appear no matter the method used on the data. However, this is a case 
specific method; hence you have to perform this verification for each new concept 
selection to make sure that the uncertainty of the data handling does not have the 
possibility to affect the outcome. 
 
Another use of the model can be as a first building block for a standardized way of 
gaining argumentative ground for the concept selections. Even though standardization 
can lead to slower progress and growth due to the simplicity of doing things like they 
are always done, the perks can be increased safety and efficiency. By construction of 
a model much like this one, but with improvements in areas of data 
representativeness, data sample size and statistical inference more could be said about 
the results of the model due to them being more accurate and the inherent 
uncertainties being better accounted for. Even if the results would still be too 
uncertain to be used quantitatively, they could surely be used in a qualitative context 
without the need for the earlier discussed additional evaluations, since much of their 
information would have been taken into account in a more detailed construction of the 
model. 
 
Since the results of the model are to be used in an early phase of development, exact 
estimates of the differences in risk will be hard to calculate. This may not be desirable 
due to the amount of time and efforts needed, and a well based qualitative argument 
may well serve the purpose enough of being suitable ground for argumentation in a 
concept selection discussion. 
 
What is more, the model can not only be used in the concept selection phase, but also 
as a means to evaluate the chosen concept after the platform has been taken into use. 
Then accurate estimates of the risk can be used in the model which will improve the 
accuracy of the results. For instance, this model could change the generic area-FAR 
values to those specific of the platform for which the concept selection is to be 
evaluated. This would allow for not only an evaluation of the selection of concept, but 
also as a verification of the model itself. If for every concept selection the model was 
used in, a verification of the aforementioned sort would be performed, it would bring 
valuable information as to how well the model is performing. It would not only add 
information as to how well the model is working, but could also be used to improve 
the model. Simply by evaluating in what way the model’s estimate during the concept 
selection phase erred compared to the model’s estimate while using the specific 
values of the platform in question a good insight might be reached as to how the 
model could be improved. 
 
10.3 Further development to increase the accuracy of the model 
As described in section 10.1, the accuracy of the model might be increased by fitting 
the data used to a suitable distribution instead of just using the mean value when 
merging certain area-FAR values. By fitting the data to a distribution in this manner, 
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some of the uncertainties will be accounted for. The amount of uncertainties that are 
accounted for will depend on the amount of data and how well it fits the distribution. 
This would put some additional requirements on the data, particularly in form of 
sample size. But it should be looked into as a means of increasing the accuracy of the 
model. 
 
By the utilization of Bayesian methods data can be weighted with regards to certain 
aspects. For instance, as discussed in section 10.1, data taken from other geographical 
locations, from other companies or older data could result in poor representativeness 
with regards to the situation in which the model is to be used, and hence present 
inaccurate results. Data with good representation could then, through Bayesian 
methods, be awarded greater weight while data with poor representation could be 
awarded less weight. 
 
Bayesian methods could also be used as a means to increase the reliability of the 
model by awarding different dignity to the area-FAR values of various installations 
used to construct the generic area-FAR values through the mean of the different area-
FAR values. A study would have to be performed where parameters such as age, size 
and manning levels where examined to see how they affect the FAR values. When the 
mean values then were calculated the different area-FAR values from the various 
platforms would be suitably weighted to increase the accuracy of the means with 
regards to aforementioned parameters. This would not increase the accuracy in the 
same manner as using distributions do describe the FAR values, but it would not put 
the same requirements on the data with regards to sample size either. Hence, it is 
another alternative that should be looked into to increase the accuracy of the model. 
 
11 Conclusions 
A risk based model for concept selection of normally unmanned installations in the 
North Sea has been developed. The model was the result of a systematic development 
procedure focusing on producing a model that is useful for decision making. The 
generated results of the constructed model reflect the difference in risk of offshore 
personnel attending the unmanned facility, with regards to different concept 
alternatives. Several steps were taken to ensure that the model would be a useful aid 
to decision makers: 
 
• The model is accounting for the actions performed during operations with 
regards to two different types of platforms on a semi-detailed level. 
• The model is based on operational data from the North Sea both with regards 
to the offshore installations as well as the helicopter failure data. 
• The model is constructed on an applicable level of detail allowing for clear 
distinctions between various concepts in an early phase of development 
without unnecessarily imposing on the user’s ability to estimate the model 
parameters. 
• The model is easily configured to incorporate other factors not currently 
accounted for, or to change how the ones already used are handled to allow 
future users to modify as needed. 
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The model however, is not necessarily a finished product as of this printing, but rather 
still a work in development. As described in this study there are a couple of areas that, 
with a bit of attention would increase the reliability of the model and the accuracy of 
its results. 
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13 Appendix A 
This appendix contains snapshots of the Excel model for further clarification on how 
the calculations have been performed. The snapshots are taken from the calculations 
of the “NUI+AP”-alternative, but the construction is identical to that of the “PMI”-
alternative. 
 
These are the color coding used in the Excel model to differ between different 
elements. 
 
 
13.1 Risk due to helicopter travels 
The formula used to calculate the risk from the helicopter flights for both of the 
alternatives. 
 
 
Abbreviation used in the formula above. 
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The estimates of the different helicopter parameters calculated in chapter 7. 
 
 
Fictitious but credible values of the input parameters used in the example. 
 
 
The PLLs calculated both per trip and per year for the”12 hour operations” and 
the”24 hour operations”. The PLLs are calculated according to the risk formula above 
but multiplied with the number of persons in the helicopter. 
 
 
The total PLL contributed by the helicopter travels. They are simply the sums of the 
“12 hour operations” and the “24 hour operations” above. 
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13.2 Risk due to presence on the platform 
These are the estimated area-FAR values from chapter 6 and the input parameter 
values used in the example in chapter 9. The manning distribution is presented in 
fractions and represents the manning distribution for each trip. The “Hours at the 
platform per trip” is simply 24 hours minus the helicopter flight time for two travels. 
However, it also contains time spent on the accommodation section of the 
accommodation platform. This due to the fact that this time constitutes as exposed 
time and is to be compared with resting on the PMI.  
 
Number of trips per year is based on the visiting distribution explained in section 
9.1.1. 
 
The total exposed hours per trip is calculated as “Hours at the platform per trip” 
multiplied with the number of persons on the trip. 
Area: Area FAR: Manning dist. (12 h) Manning dist. (24h)
Weather Deck 4.16 0.03 0.03
Utility Area 3.11 0.15 0.05
Process Area 5.74 0.15 0.2
Well Bay Area 8.02 0.15 0.2
Sub-Cellar Deck 6.32 0.02 0.02
Accomodation Area of the AP 1.66 0.5 0.5
Hours at the platform per trip: 23.34 23.34
Number of trips per year: 96 48
Number of persons per trip: 12 10
Total exposed hours per trip: 280.08 233.4
Total exposed time during a year: 26887.68 11203.2  
 
 
The PLL per type of operation and area is calculated by dividing the area-FAR by 
1.0e8 hours multiplied with the manning distribution seen above and also multiplied 
with the respective hours per type of operation, i.e. per trip or per year.  
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The total PLLs due to presence on the platform are calculated by summarizing the 
PLLs either per trip or per year respectively for both “12 hour operations” and “24 
hour operations”. 
 
 
13.3 Total PLL 
The total PLL for an alternative, i.e. either “NUI+AP”-alternative which is shown 
above and below or the “PMI”-alternative, is the calculated by summarizing the PLL 
due to helicopter travels and the PLL due to presence on the platform for each 
alternative respectively. 
 
 
13.4 Summary 
The summary presents the results of both the alternatives as well as the quotient 
between them. They should not be used in their quantitative context but rather as an 
indication which of the two alternatives exposes the personnel to the least amount of 
risk, see section 9.1.3. 
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